Addressing the challenges of implementing evidence-based prioritisation in global health.

Global health requires evidence-based approaches to improve health and decrease inequalities. In a roundtable discussion between health practitioners, funders, academics and policy-makers, we recognised key areas for improvement to deliver better-informed, sustainable and equitable global health practices. These focus on considering information-sharing mechanisms and developing evidence-based frameworks that take an adaptive function-based approach, grounded in the ability to perform and respond to prioritised needs. Increasing social engagement as well as sector and participant diversity in whole-of-society decision-making, and collaborating with and optimising on hyperlocal and global regional entities, will improve prioritisation of global health capabilities. Since the skills required to navigate drivers of pandemics, and the challenges in prioritising, capacity building and response do not sit squarely in the health sector, it is essential to integrate expertise from a broad range of fields to maximise on available knowledge during decision-making and system development. Here, we review the current assessment tools and provide seven discussion points for how improvements to implementation of evidence-based prioritisation can improve global health.

Modelling the economic burden of SARS-CoV-2 infection in health care workers in four countries.

Health care workers (HCWs) experienced greater risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study applies a cost-of-illness (COI) approach to model the economic burden associated with SARS-CoV-2 infections among HCWs in five low- and middle-income sites (Kenya, Eswatini, Colombia, KwaZulu-Natal province, and Western Cape province of South Africa) during the first year of the pandemic. We find that not only did HCWs have a higher incidence of COVID-19 than the general population, but in all sites except Colombia, viral transmission from infected HCWs to close contacts resulted in substantial secondary SARS-CoV-2 infection and death. Disruption in health services as a result of HCW illness affected maternal and child deaths dramatically. Total economic losses attributable to SARS-CoV-2 infection among HCWs as a share of total health expenditure ranged from 1.51% in Colombia to 8.38% in Western Cape province, South Africa. This economic burden to society highlights the importance of adequate infection prevention and control measures to minimize the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in HCWs.

The road to achieving epidemic-ready primary health care.

Millions of avoidable deaths arising from the COVID-19 pandemic emphasise the need for epidemic-ready primary health care aligned with public health to identify and stop outbreaks, maintain essential services during disruptions, strengthen population resilience, and ensure health worker and patient safety. The improvement in health security from epidemic-ready primary health care is a strong argument for increased political support and can expand primary health-care capacities to improve detection, vaccination, treatment, and coordination with public health-needs that became more apparent during the pandemic. Progress towards epidemic-ready primary health care is likely to be stepwise and incremental, advancing when opportunity arises based on explicit agreement on a core set of services, improved use of external and national funds, and payment based in large part on empanelment and capitation to improve outcomes and accountability, supplemented with funding for core staffing and infrastructure and well designed incentives for health improvement. Health-care worker and broader civil society advocacy, political consensus, and bolstering government legitimacy could promote strong primary health care. Epidemic-ready primary health-care infrastructure that is able to help prevent and withstand the next pandemic will require substantial financial and structural reforms and sustained political and financial commitment. Governments, advocates, and bilateral and multilateral agencies should seize this window of opportunity before it closes.

Implementation of the 7-1-7 target for detection, notification, and response to public health threats in five countries: a retrospective, observational study.

BACKGROUND: Suboptimal detection and response to recent outbreaks, including COVID-19 and mpox (formerly known as monkeypox), have shown that the world is insufficiently prepared for public health threats. Routine monitoring of detection and response performance of health emergency systems through timeliness metrics has been proposed to evaluate and improve outbreak preparedness and contain health threats early. We implemented 7-1-7 to measure the timeliness of detection (target of ≤7 days from emergence), notification (target of ≤1 day from detection), and completion of seven early response actions (target of ≤7 days from notification), and we identified bottlenecks to and enablers of system performance. METHODS: In this retrospective, observational study, we conducted reviews of public health events in Brazil, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda with staff from ministries of health and national public health institutes. For selected public health events occurring from Jan 1, 2018, to Dec 31, 2022, we calculated timeliness intervals for detection, notification, and early response actions, and synthesised identified bottlenecks and enablers. We mapped bottlenecks and enablers to Joint External Evaluation (second edition) indicators. FINDINGS: Of 41 public health events assessed, 22 (54%) met a target of 7 days to detect (median 6 days [range 0-157]), 29 (71%) met a target of 1 day to notify (0 days [0-24]), and 20 (49%) met a target of 7 days to complete all early response actions (8 days [0-72]). 11 (27%) events met the complete 7-1-7 target, with variation among event types. 25 (61%) of 41 bottlenecks to and 27 (51%) of 53 enablers of detection were at the health facility level, with delays to notification (14 [44%] of 32 bottlenecks) and response (22 [39%] of 56 bottlenecks) most often at an intermediate public health (ie, municipal, district, county, state, or province) level. Rapid resource mobilisation for responses (six [9%] of 65 enablers) from the national level enabled faster responses. INTERPRETATION: The 7-1-7 target is feasible to measure and to achieve, and assessment with this framework can identify areas for performance improvement and help prioritise national planning. Increased investments must be made at the health facility and intermediate public health levels for improved systems to detect, notify, and rapidly respond to emerging public health threats. FUNDING: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Investing in global health security: Estimating cost requirements for country-level capacity building

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted critical gaps in global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. To effectively allocate investments that address these gaps, it is first necessary to quantify the extent of the need, evaluate the types of resources and activities that require additional support, and engage the global community in ongoing assessment, planning, and implementation. Which investments are needed, where, to strengthen health security? This work aims to estimate costs to strengthen country-level health security, globally and identify associated cost drivers. The cost of building public health capacity is estimated based on investments needed, per country, to progress towards the benchmarks identified by the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation (JEE). For each country, costs are estimated to progress to a score of "demonstrated capacity” (4) across indicators. Over five years, an estimated US$124 billion is needed to reach "demonstrated capacity” on each indicator of the JEE for each of the 196 States Parties to the International Health Regulations (IHR). Personnel costs, including skilled health, public health, and animal health workers, are the single most influential cost driver, comprising 66% of total costs. These findings, and the data generated by this effort, provide cost estimates to inform ongoing health security financing discussions at the global level. The results highlight the significant need for sustainable financing mechanisms for both workforce development and ongoing support for the health and public health workforce.

Urban pandemic response: Survey results describing the experiences from twenty-five cities during the COVID-19 pandemic

Since first being detected in Wuhan, China in late December 2019, COVID-19 has demanded a response from all levels of government. While the role of local governments in routine public health functions is well understood–and the response to the pandemic has highlighted the importance of involving local governments in the response to and management of large, multifaceted challenges–their role in pandemic response remains more undefined. Accordingly, to better understand how local governments in cities were involved in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted a survey involving cities in the Partnership for Healthy Cities to: (i) understand which levels of government were responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select pandemic response activities;(ii) document when response activities were implemented;(iii) characterize how challenging response activities were;and (iv) query about future engagement in pandemic and epidemic preparedness. Twenty-five cities from around the world completed the survey and we used descriptive statistics to summarize the urban experience in pandemic response. Our results show that national authorities were responsible and accountable for a majority of the activities considered, but that local governments were also responsible and accountable for key activities–especially risk communication and coordinating with community-based organizations and civil society organizations. Further, most response activities were implemented after COVID-19 had been confirmed in a city, many pandemic response activities proved to be challenging for local authorities, and nearly all local authorities envisioned being more engaged in pandemic preparedness and response following the COVID-19 pandemic. This descriptive research represents an important contribution to an expanding evidence base focused on improving the response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future outbreaks.

How do local-level authorities engage in epidemic and pandemic preparedness activities and coordinate with higher levels of government? Survey results from 33 cities

The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that there are opportunities to improve preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks. While much attention has been given to understanding national-level preparedness, relatively little attention has been given to understanding preparedness at the local-level. We, therefore, aim to describe (1) how local governments in urban environments were engaged in epidemic preparedness efforts before the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) how they were coordinating with authorities at higher levels of governance before COVID-19. We developed a survey and distributed it to 50 cities around the world involved in the Partnership for Healthy Cities. The survey included several question formats including free-response, matrices, and multiple-choice questions. RACI matrices, a project management tool that helps explain coordination structures, were used to understand the level of government responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select preparedness activities. We used descriptive statistics to summarize local-level engagement in preparedness. Local authorities from 33 cities completed the survey. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 20 of the cities had completed infectious disease risk assessments, 10 completed all-hazards risk assessments, 11 completed simulation exercises, 10 completed after-action reviews, 19 developed preparedness and response plans, three reported involvement in their country's Joint External Evaluation of the International Health Regulations, and eight cities reported involvement in the development of their countries' National Action Plan for Health Security. RACI matrices revealed various models of epidemic preparedness, with responsibility often shared across levels, and national governments accountable for the most activities, compared to other governance levels. In conclusion, national governments maintain the largest role in epidemic and pandemic preparedness but the role of subnational and local governments is not negligible. Local-level actors engage in a variety of preparedness activities and future efforts should strive to better include these actors in preparedness as a means of bolstering local, national, and global health security.

Investing in global health security: Estimating cost requirements for country-level capacity building.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted critical gaps in global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. To effectively allocate investments that address these gaps, it is first necessary to quantify the extent of the need, evaluate the types of resources and activities that require additional support, and engage the global community in ongoing assessment, planning, and implementation. Which investments are needed, where, to strengthen health security? This work aims to estimate costs to strengthen country-level health security, globally and identify associated cost drivers. The cost of building public health capacity is estimated based on investments needed, per country, to progress towards the benchmarks identified by the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation (JEE). For each country, costs are estimated to progress to a score of "demonstrated capacity" (4) across indicators. Over five years, an estimated US$124 billion is needed to reach "demonstrated capacity" on each indicator of the JEE for each of the 196 States Parties to the International Health Regulations (IHR). Personnel costs, including skilled health, public health, and animal health workers, are the single most influential cost driver, comprising 66% of total costs. These findings, and the data generated by this effort, provide cost estimates to inform ongoing health security financing discussions at the global level. The results highlight the significant need for sustainable financing mechanisms for both workforce development and ongoing support for the health and public health workforce.

Urban pandemic response: Survey results describing the experiences from twenty-five cities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since first being detected in Wuhan, China in late December 2019, COVID-19 has demanded a response from all levels of government. While the role of local governments in routine public health functions is well understood-and the response to the pandemic has highlighted the importance of involving local governments in the response to and management of large, multifaceted challenges-their role in pandemic response remains more undefined. Accordingly, to better understand how local governments in cities were involved in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted a survey involving cities in the Partnership for Healthy Cities to: (i) understand which levels of government were responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select pandemic response activities; (ii) document when response activities were implemented; (iii) characterize how challenging response activities were; and (iv) query about future engagement in pandemic and epidemic preparedness. Twenty-five cities from around the world completed the survey and we used descriptive statistics to summarize the urban experience in pandemic response. Our results show that national authorities were responsible and accountable for a majority of the activities considered, but that local governments were also responsible and accountable for key activities-especially risk communication and coordinating with community-based organizations and civil society organizations. Further, most response activities were implemented after COVID-19 had been confirmed in a city, many pandemic response activities proved to be challenging for local authorities, and nearly all local authorities envisioned being more engaged in pandemic preparedness and response following the COVID-19 pandemic. This descriptive research represents an important contribution to an expanding evidence base focused on improving the response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future outbreaks.

How do local-level authorities engage in epidemic and pandemic preparedness activities and coordinate with higher levels of government? Survey results from 33 cities.

The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that there are opportunities to improve preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks. While much attention has been given to understanding national-level preparedness, relatively little attention has been given to understanding preparedness at the local-level. We, therefore, aim to describe (1) how local governments in urban environments were engaged in epidemic preparedness efforts before the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) how they were coordinating with authorities at higher levels of governance before COVID-19. We developed a survey and distributed it to 50 cities around the world involved in the Partnership for Healthy Cities. The survey included several question formats including free-response, matrices, and multiple-choice questions. RACI matrices, a project management tool that helps explain coordination structures, were used to understand the level of government responsible, accountable, consulted, and informed regarding select preparedness activities. We used descriptive statistics to summarize local-level engagement in preparedness. Local authorities from 33 cities completed the survey. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 20 of the cities had completed infectious disease risk assessments, 10 completed all-hazards risk assessments, 11 completed simulation exercises, 10 completed after-action reviews, 19 developed preparedness and response plans, three reported involvement in their country's Joint External Evaluation of the International Health Regulations, and eight cities reported involvement in the development of their countries' National Action Plan for Health Security. RACI matrices revealed various models of epidemic preparedness, with responsibility often shared across levels, and national governments accountable for the most activities, compared to other governance levels. In conclusion, national governments maintain the largest role in epidemic and pandemic preparedness but the role of subnational and local governments is not negligible. Local-level actors engage in a variety of preparedness activities and future efforts should strive to better include these actors in preparedness as a means of bolstering local, national, and global health security.

Preparing for Pandemics and Other Health Threats: Societal Approaches to Protect and Improve Health.

This Viewpoint discusses 3 areas in need of progress regarding societal approaches to pandemics and other health threats: a renaissance in public health; robustness of primary health care; and resilience of individuals and communities, with higher levels of trust in government and society.

Digital Point Solutions for Extending Contact Tracing Capacity.

BACKGROUND: Initial COVID-19 surges in the United States created a need for technology to supplement human resources to increase efficiency and efficacy. METHODS: Resolve to Save Lives worked with jurisdictions to co-design four technology solutions-Epi Viaduct data pipeline, Epi Contacts contact elicitation webform, Epi Locator contact information search plugin and Epi Viewpoint case management system-to expand the capacity of case investigation and contact tracing (CI/CT) teams. We assessed impact on reducing CI/CT time intervals for COVID-19 using product data and user feedback. RESULTS: Epi Viaduct accelerated the transfer of approximately 7,400,000 records from an electronic lab reporting (ELR) system in a single jurisdiction to the respective case management system (CMS) from more than 2.5 hours to less than one minute and reduced time to remove duplicate lab results from multiple days to less than six hours. Epi Contacts focused on increasing efficacy of contact elicitation and, during a single period, 10% of index cases (9,440/96,319) completed Epi Contacts for a total of approximately 18,700 contacts elicited. User interviews indicated the tool increased speed of CI/CT workflows. In total, 134,410 searches were run in Epi Locator by 7,320 distinct users-75% of which returned one or more person matches. A simple CMS, Epi Viewpoint, was developed and completed, but not deployed. CONCLUSIONS: Systems to mount large-scale population-based contact tracing programs were developed and implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic and can be adapted for CI/CT programs aiming to control the spread of other communicable diseases such as STDs.

Psychosocial determinants of adherence to public health and social measures (PHSMs) in 18 African Union Member States during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic: results of a cross-sectional survey.

OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to gain a better understanding of the psychosocial and sociodemographic factors that affected adherence to COVID-19 public health and social measures (PHSMs), and to identify the factors that most strongly related to whether citizens followed public health guidance. DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Nationally representative telephone surveys were conducted from 4-17 August 2020 in 18 African Union Member States. A total of 21 600 adults (mean age=32.7 years, SD=11.4) were interviewed (1200 in each country). OUTCOME MEASURES: Information including sociodemographics, adherence to PHSMs and psychosocial variables was collected. Logistic regression models examined the association between PHSM adherence (eg, physical distancing, gathering restrictions) and sociodemographic and psychosocial characteristics (eg, risk perception, trust). Factors affecting adherence were ranked using the Shapley regression decomposition method. RESULTS: Adherence to PHSMs was high, with better adherence to personal than community PHSMs (65.5% vs 30.2%, p<0.05). Psychosocial measures were significantly associated with personal and community PHSMs (p<0.05). Women and older adults demonstrated better adherence to personal PHSMs (adjusted OR (aOR): women=1.43, age=1.01, p<0.05) and community PHSMs (aOR: women=1.57, age=1.01, p<0.05). Secondary education was associated with better adherence only to personal PHSMs (aOR=1.22, p<0.05). Rural residence and access to running water were associated with better adherence to community PHSMs (aOR=1.12 and 1.18, respectively, p<0.05). The factors that most affected adherence to personal PHSMs were: self-efficacy; trust in hospitals/health centres; knowledge about face masks; trust in the president; and gender. For community PHSMs they were: gender; trust in the president; access to running water; trust in hospitals/health centres; and risk perception. CONCLUSIONS: Psychosocial factors, particularly trust in authorities and institutions, played a critical role in PHSM adherence. Adherence to community PHSMs was lower than personal PHSMs since they can impose significant burdens, particularly on the socially vulnerable.